Prediction error minimization: Implications for Embodied Cognition and the Extended Mind Hypothesis

- Prediction error minimization (PEM) has become very influential in the cognitive sciences.
- PEM has important implications for Embodied Cognition and the Extended Mind Hypothesis.
- Clark argues that PEM is compatible with Embodied and Extended cognition.
- Hohwy claims that PEM actually rules out some versions of Embodied and Extended cognition.
- The paper identifies the theoretical issues that may help to adjudicate between them.

Over the past few years, the prediction error minimization (PEM) framework has increasingly been gaining ground throughout the cognitive sciences. A key issue dividing proponents of PEM is how we should conceptualize the relation between brain, body and environment. Clark advocates a version of PEM which retains, at least to a certain extent, his prior commitments to Embodied Cognition and to the Extended Mind Hypothesis. Hohwy, by contrast, presents a sustained argument that PEM actually rules out at least some versions of Embodied and Extended cognition. The aim of this paper is to facilitate a constructive debate between these two competing alternatives by explicating the different theoretical motivations underlying them, and by homing in on the relevant issues that may help to adjudicate between them.