کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5059407 | 1371783 | 2014 | 6 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The stability of decision making in committees: The one-core
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
We study the stability of decision making in committees. A policy proposal introduced by a committee member is either adopted or abandoned in favor of a new proposal after deliberations. If a proposal is abandoned, it is in spite of the committee member who introduced it, who does not cooperate in any effort to defeat it. Shenoy (1980) proposes the one-core as a solution concept for this game, and shows that this solution may be empty. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a stable policy under the majority rule. This result highlights a trade-off between the size of a committee, the number of competing policy options, and the existence of a stable outcome. Our findings imply a tension between political stability and the existence of a large number of competing interests in democracies.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Economics Letters - Volume 122, Issue 3, March 2014, Pages 390-395
Journal: Economics Letters - Volume 122, Issue 3, March 2014, Pages 390-395
نویسندگان
Joseph Armel Momo Kenfack, Roland Pongou, Bertrand Tchantcho,