کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5093798 1376144 2011 24 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
CEO and board chair roles: To split or not to split?
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری کسب و کار و مدیریت بین المللی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
CEO and board chair roles: To split or not to split?
چکیده انگلیسی
We examine the performance and compensation implications of firms' decisions to combine the roles of CEO and board chairman (duality). We document that firms that split the CEO and chairman positions due to investor pressure have significantly lower announcement returns and subsequent performance, and lower contributions of investments to shareholder wealth. Further, these performance outcomes are more negative for firms with higher predicted probabilities of duality based on a model of economic determinants of board leadership structure. We also find that pay-performance sensitivity in CEO compensation contracts are significantly lower following a split in the CEO and chairman positions, and significantly higher following a combination in these positions. Our evidence suggests that on average, board leadership choices by firms and market responses are consistent with efficiency arguments, and recent proposals for all firms to separate the CEO and chairman roles warrant more careful consideration.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Corporate Finance - Volume 17, Issue 5, December 2011, Pages 1595-1618
نویسندگان
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