کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5100098 1478736 2017 17 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The structure of Nash equilibria in Poisson games
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
ساختار تعادل نش در بازی های پواسون
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
We show that many results on the structure and stability of equilibria in finite games extend to Poisson games. In particular, the set of Nash equilibria of a Poisson game consists of finitely many connected components and at least one of them contains a stable set (De Sinopoli et al., 2014). In a similar vein, we prove that the number of Nash equilibria in Poisson voting games under plurality, negative plurality, and (when there are at most three candidates) approval rule, as well as in Poisson coordination games, is generically finite. As in finite games, these results are obtained exploiting the geometric structure of the set of Nash equilibria which, in the case of Poisson games, is shown to be semianalytic.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 169, May 2017, Pages 128-144
نویسندگان
, ,