کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7243467 | 1471657 | 2014 | 9 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
CEO control, corporate performance and pay-performance sensitivity
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
کنترل مدیر عامل، عملکرد شرکت و حساسیت پرداخت-عملکرد
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
Agency theory suggests that high pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) of CEO's compensation is an important motivation mechanism to the CEO to improve corporate performance. We develop a simple model that suggests that reverse causality should also be considered. Specifically, our model predicts that when good performance is expected, a powerful CEO will push for a contract with higher PPS. Data from 135 Israeli companies over a five-year period confirm the model's main prediction. Our empirical analysis shows that when the CEO is the chairman of the board of directors and thus is more powerful in affecting his compensation scheme, he achieves a high PPS in good periods (in terms of corporate performance), compared to similar powerful CEOs in periods of bad performance, and also compared to less powerful CEOs in good periods.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 106, October 2014, Pages 166-174
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 106, October 2014, Pages 166-174
نویسندگان
Yaron Amzaleg, Ofer H. Azar, Uri Ben-Zion, Ahron Rosenfeld,