کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7349261 | 1476600 | 2018 | 5 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Information disclosure in auctions with downstream competition
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
افشای اطلاعات در مزایده با رقابت پایین دست
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
When bidders' valuations are derived from a downstream market in which they may compete, the allocation to the firms with the lowest costs can differ from the allocation that maximizes the ex post valuations of the bidders. I consider the problem of auctioning two goods to bidders whose valuations for a good flexibly depend on their and their rival's costs as well as the identity of the rival. I show that revealing the identities of winners through a sequential auction procedure leads to allocations in which bidders tend to have higher ex post valuations but also higher costs when compared to a simultaneous auction.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Economics Letters - Volume 163, February 2018, Pages 22-26
Journal: Economics Letters - Volume 163, February 2018, Pages 22-26
نویسندگان
Justin Burkett,