Quality control of the agricultural products supply chain based on “Internet +”

This paper describes a quality-control supply-chain model using the “Internet +” paradigm. The model is based on principal-agent theory, which considers the reputational loss due to inferior products and external responsibility identification. After model analysis and simulation verification, the results show that the optimal quality-control level and market price of agricultural products can be achieved in the agricultural supply chain based on “Internet +” if and only if the information platform's claim to the agricultural producer is less than the agricultural producer's claim to the delivery service provider. Also, a rise in consumers' claims or the agricultural producer's reputational loss due to inferior products will motivate the quality control of an agricultural procedure. Meanwhile, the market price of agricultural products will also increase with enhanced quality control procedures. The quality-control level of a delivery service provider is inversely proportional to the information platform or its own reputational loss. Thus, the key to promoting quality control along the supply chain is to strengthen the responsibility confirmation of an inferior product between the agricultural producer and the delivery service provider.