کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی ترجمه فارسی نسخه تمام متن
91245 159773 2016 11 صفحه PDF سفارش دهید دانلود کنید
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Nash bargaining and renegotiation with social preferences: case of the roundwood log supply contracts in the French timber market
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
چانه زنی نش و مذاکره دوباره با ترجیحات اجتماعی: مورد ،قرارداد عرضه ورود به سیستم الوار مدور در بازار چوب فرانسوی
کلمات کلیدی
C78؛ D21؛ D86؛ ¬ L33 بخش؛ تحقیقات L73 عملیاتی؛ چانه زنی نش؛ مذاکره دوباره. ترجیحات اجتماعی؛ قرارداد تامین؛ بخش مربوط به جنگل ها
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم زیستی و بیوفناوری علوم کشاورزی و بیولوژیک جنگلداری
چکیده انگلیسی


• A timber and log public supplier and a lumber manufacturer negotiate a roundwood log supply contract.
• While the lumber manufacturer is a profit-maximizing agent, the timber and log public supplier can be either public-interest-oriented or profit-maximizing.
• The unique equilibrium log supply contract only involves the price negotiation.
• The supplier's public interest and the manufacturer's bargaining power work as strategic substitutes.
• The renegotiation reveals a memory effect over the quantities issued from bargaining.

By considering the French forest-based sector, we study both negotiation and renegotiation between a public timber and roundwood log supplier, which can be either public-interest-oriented or profit-maximizing, and a profit-maximizing lumber manufacturer. We first prove that the Nash bargaining game yields a unique equilibrium log supply contract, at which the negotiation takes only place on the prices. We then find that the expected profit-maximizing is achieved when the supplier's public interest and the manufacturer's bargaining power are strategic substitutes. The renegotiation reveals the presence of a memory effect over the quantities issued from bargaining. Our results can be generalized to all economic settings that revolve around public interest and commodity risk management.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Forest Policy and Economics - Volume 69, August 2016, Pages 90–100
نویسندگان
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