کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
9551732 | 1373539 | 2005 | 33 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
House allocation with existing tenants: an equivalence
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We analyze two mechanisms designed to eliminate inefficiencies in house allocation problems where there are both existing tenants and newcomers. The first mechanism chooses the unique core allocation of a “sister” exchange economy constructed by endowing each existing tenant with her current house and each newcomer with a random vacant house. The second mechanism chooses an ordering from a given distribution and determines the final outcome as follows: Assign the agents the best available house one-at-a-time following their ordering in the queue and whenever an agent demands the house of an existing tenant who is still in the line, modify the queue by inserting the existing tenant at the top. Whenever a loop of existing tenants forms, assign each of them the house she demands and proceed. We show that the first mechanism is equivalent to an extreme case of the second which favors the newcomers.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 52, Issue 1, July 2005, Pages 153-185
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 52, Issue 1, July 2005, Pages 153-185
نویسندگان
Tayfun Sönmez, M. Utku Ãnver,