کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
957429 | 928526 | 2010 | 20 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Substitutes and stability for matching with contracts
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
We consider the matching with contracts framework of Hatfield and Milgrom [20], and we introduce new concepts of bilateral and unilateral substitutes. We show that the bilateral substitutes condition is a sufficient condition for the existence of a stable allocation in this framework. However, the set of stable allocations does not form a lattice under this condition, and there does not necessarily exist a doctor-optimal stable allocation. Under a slightly stronger condition, unilateral substitutes, the set of stable allocations still does not necessarily form a lattice with respect to doctors' preferences, but there does exist a doctor-optimal stable allocation, and other key results such as incentive compatibility and the rural hospitals theorem are recovered.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 145, Issue 5, September 2010, Pages 1704-1723
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 145, Issue 5, September 2010, Pages 1704-1723
نویسندگان
John William Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima,