کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
957685 1478755 2008 33 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Price taking equilibrium in economies with multiple memberships in clubs and unbounded club sizes
چکیده انگلیسی

We model an economy with clubs (or jurisdictions) where individuals may belong to multiple clubs and where clubs sizes are arbitrary—clubs may be restricted to consist of only one or two persons, or as large as the entire economy, or anything in-between. Notions of price-taking equilibrium and the core, both with communication costs, are introduced. These notions take into account that there is a small communication cost of deviating from a given outcome. We demonstrate that, given communication costs, for all sufficiently large economies the core is nonempty and the set of price-taking equilibrium outcomes is equivalent to the core.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 140, Issue 1, May 2008, Pages 246–278
نویسندگان
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