Keywords: جبران اجباری; G20; G34; J24; J 33; Executive compensation; Human capital; Managerial ability;
مقالات ISI جبران اجباری (ترجمه نشده)
مقالات زیر هنوز به فارسی ترجمه نشده اند.
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در صورتی که به ترجمه آماده هر یک از مقالات زیر نیاز داشته باشید، می توانید سفارش دهید تا مترجمان با تجربه این مجموعه در اسرع وقت آن را برای شما ترجمه نمایند.
Keywords: جبران اجباری; G13; G30; J33; M52; Executive compensation; Optimal contracting; Executive stock options; Cost effectiveness; Incentive effects; Asian options; Indexed options;
Keywords: جبران اجباری; 'Two strikes' rule; Say on pay; Executive compensation; Pay-performance link; Chief executive officer; Corporate governance;
Keywords: جبران اجباری; G30; J33; M12; O32; Executive compensation; Managerial incentives; Risk taking; R&D; Investment efficiency; Firm performance;
Keywords: جبران اجباری; G3; J33; Z13; Executive compensation; Peer effects; Benchmark; CEO;
Keywords: جبران اجباری; Equity incentives; Executive compensation; Misreporting; Earnings management; Restatements; SEC enforcement actions; J33; G34; M41; M52;
Keywords: جبران اجباری; G34; J33; J41; M52; CEO employment contracts; Severance; Golden parachutes; Executive compensation; Mergers and acquisitions;
Keywords: جبران اجباری; G18; G32; G34; Insider trading restrictions; Executive compensation; Insider ownership;
Keywords: جبران اجباری; Behavioral agency model; Reference point; Executive compensation; Environment; Risk taking; Social comparison;
Keywords: جبران اجباری; G32; G34; J32; Corporate pension policy; Managerial incentives; Executive compensation; Unfunded pension liabilities;
Keywords: جبران اجباری; Mergers; Acquisitions; Managerial incentives; Executive compensation; Sarbanes–Oxley Act
Keywords: جبران اجباری; Business group; Executive compensation; RPE; ChinaG32; G34; J31; L22
Keywords: جبران اجباری; G14; G32; G34; J32; J33; M52Inside debt; Pensions; Executive compensation; Incentives
Keywords: جبران اجباری; Banking; Executive compensation; Risk-taking; Financial stabilityG21; G28; G32; J33
Keywords: جبران اجباری; G32; G38; G15Foreign exchange exposure; Executive compensation; Pensions; Managerial risk-taking
Keywords: جبران اجباری; G34; J33; M41Chief Financial Officers; Executive compensation; Gender pay gap; Earnings management; Risk aversion; Australia
Keywords: جبران اجباری; Executive compensation; Financial crises; Bank risk
CEO Pay Slice as a measure of CEO dominance
Keywords: جبران اجباری; D23; G38; J33; Corporate governance; Executive compensation; Entrenchment; Pay distribution;
International work experience and compensation: Is more always better for CFOs?
Keywords: جبران اجباری; Chief Financial Officers (CFOs); Executive compensation; Human capital; International careers; International managers; International work experience; Social capital; Top management internationalization;
Technology executives in the changing accounting information environment: Impact of IFRS adoption on CIO compensation
Keywords: جبران اجباری; Chief Information Officer; Executive compensation; Regulatory reform; International Financial Reporting Standards;
Does improved disclosure lead to higher executive compensation? Evidence from the conversion to IFRS and the dual-class share system in China
Keywords: جبران اجباری; Information disclosure; Executive compensation; Accounting standards;
Does fairness breed efficiency? Pay gap and firm productivity in China
Keywords: جبران اجباری; D31; J24; J31; J33; Pay gap; Productivity; Executive compensation; Wages; China;
What have we learned from SFAS 123r and IFRS 2? A review of existing evidence and future research suggestions
Keywords: جبران اجباری; Executive compensation; Stock options; IFRS 2; SFAS 123r;
Insider sales in IPOs: Consequences of liquidity needs
Keywords: جبران اجباری; G32; G30; G34; Initial public offering; Cash; Executive compensation; Insider selling;
Evidence on the outcome of Say-On-Pay votes: How managers, directors, and shareholders respond
Keywords: جبران اجباری; Corporate governance; Executive compensation; Shareholder activism; Say-on-Pay; Dodd-Frank Act; G34; G38;
Executive compensation in family firms: The effect of multiple family members
Keywords: جبران اجباری; Family firms; Ownership structure; Executive compensation; China; G3; G32; G34;
The political determinants of executive compensation: Evidence from an emerging economy
Keywords: جبران اجباری; Executive compensation; Political economy; State ownership; Market friction; G34; H70; M12; P26; P31;
Financial regulation in geographically-segmented executive labor markets: Evidence from TARP
Keywords: جبران اجباری; Executive compensation; Regulation; Troubled Asset Relief Program; Financial crisis;
Is there an inverse U-shaped relationship between pay and performance?
Keywords: جبران اجباری; Executive compensation; Firm performance; Pay-for-performance
Mandatory IFRS adoption and executive compensation: Evidence from China
Keywords: جبران اجباری; J33; M41; M48IFRS adoption; Executive compensation; Accounting-based performance sensitivity
How do market forces affect executive compensation in Chinese state-owned enterprises?
Keywords: جبران اجباری; G320; G380; J310; Market-oriented reform; Executive compensation; Pay-performance sensitivity; China;
The determinants and effects of CEO-employee pay ratios
Keywords: جبران اجباری; D24; G34; J33; L14; Employee incentives; Productivity; Pay ratio; Executive compensation;
Securitization of corporate assets and executive compensation
Keywords: جبران اجباری; Securitization; Executive compensation; Financial constraints; Moral hazard;
Managerial risk-taking incentives and non-GAAP earnings disclosures
Keywords: جبران اجباری; Executive compensation; Risk-taking; Managerial incentives; Disclosure policy; Non-GAAP earnings;
Third-party endorsements of CEO quality, managerial discretion, and stakeholder reactions
Keywords: جبران اجباری; CEO quality; Third-party endorsements; Managerial discretion; Corporate governance; Executive compensation; Firm market value
The effect of conference calls on equity incentives: An empirical investigation
Keywords: جبران اجباری; G30; G34; M41Conference calls; Voluntary disclosures; Executive compensation; Capital markets
Ceo gender and firm performance
Keywords: جبران اجباری; Executive compensation; Gender; Performances; Risk aversion
Incentive effects of bonus taxes in a principal-agent model
Keywords: جبران اجباری; H24; J30; M52Principal-agent model; Bonus tax; Executive compensation; Incentive pay; Pay regulation
CEO contract design: How do strong principals do it?
Keywords: جبران اجباری; G32; G34; J33LBOs; Employment contracts; Contracting theory; Executive compensation
CEO compensation contagion: Evidence from an exogenous shock
Keywords: جبران اجباری; Executive compensation; Classified board; Poison pill; Delaware; Corporate governanceG30; G34
Peer group ties and executive compensation networks
Keywords: جبران اجباری; Inequality; Networks; Executive compensation; Labor markets; Elites
A survey of executive compensation contracts in China’s listed companies
Keywords: جبران اجباری; Executive compensation; Voluntary disclosure; Incentives; Performance measures
CEO inside debt and hedging decisions: Lessons from the U.S. banking industry
Keywords: جبران اجباری; G21; G32; J33; Inside debt; Executive compensation; Bank risk; Hedging; Financial regulation;
Some unpleasant general equilibrium implications of executive incentive compensation contracts
Keywords: جبران اجباری; E32; J33Delegation; Executive compensation; Indeterminacy and instability
An examination of executive compensation in the restaurant industry
Keywords: جبران اجباری; Executive compensation; Restaurant industry; Executive characteristics; Firm performance
Revisiting the incentive effects of executive stock options
Keywords: جبران اجباری; J33; M52; Executive compensation; Stock options; Incentives;
The effect of internal control deficiencies on the usefulness of earnings in executive compensation
Keywords: جبران اجباری; Sarbanes-Oxley Act; Internal control material weaknesses (ICMW); Executive compensation; Earnings;
Are banks happy when managers go long? The information content of managers’ vested option holdings for loan pricing
Keywords: جبران اجباری; G12; G21; M12; M52Credit quality; Executive compensation; Loan pricing; Options; Volatility
Investment in organization capital
Keywords: جبران اجباری; D23; G34; Organization capital; Corporate governance; Managerial turnover; Executive compensation; Mergers and acquisitions;
Structural models and endogeneity in corporate finance: The link between managerial ownership and corporate performance
Keywords: جبران اجباری; G32; G34; L20; M52; C36Corporate governance; Managerial ownership; Executive compensation; Corporate performance; Structural model; Endogeneity