An incentive-based distributed mechanism for scheduling divisible loads in tree networks

The underlying assumption of Divisible Load Scheduling (DLS) theory is that the processors composing the network are obedient, i.e., they do not “cheat” the scheduling algorithm. This assumption is unrealistic if the processors are owned by autonomous, self-interested organizations that have no a priori motivation for cooperation and they will manipulate the algorithm if it is beneficial to do so. In this paper, we address this issue by designing a distributed mechanism for scheduling divisible loads in tree networks, called DLS-T, which provides incentives to processors for reporting their true processing capacity and executing their assigned load at full processing capacity. We prove that the DLS-T mechanism computes the optimal allocation in an ex post Nash equilibrium. Finally, we simulate and study the mechanism under various network structures and processor parameters.

► Augmented DLS theory with incentives such that it is beneficial for processors to truthfully report and process the load.
► Proposed DLS-T a distributed mechanism for scheduling divisible loads in tree networks.
► DLS-T computes the optimal allocation in an ex-post Nash equilibrium.
► Experimental evaluation of DLS-T under various network structures and processor parameters.