کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
4502569 | 1320579 | 2011 | 6 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Effects of encounter in a population of spatial prisoner’s dilemma players Effects of encounter in a population of spatial prisoner’s dilemma players](/preview/png/4502569.png)
We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma games, whereby each player extends its interaction scope by trying to interact with a certain number of encounters randomly chosen from its non-neighbors, in addition to its permanently linked nearest neighbors. Furthermore, the non-neighbors treat the initiative interactions in two scenarios: definitely accepting that from the cooperators, whereas guardedly interacting with defectors with an acceptance probability which may take arbitrary value in [0,1]. Importantly, our results reveal that the proposed encounter mechanism is a potent extrinsic factor that is able to boost cooperation when appropriately adjusting the values of the encounter number and acceptance probability, though rational players would always defect in one-shot encounters, regardless of the action from the counterparts. We hope our studies may help understand that the proposed encounter mechanism is also an important ingredient of a flourishing cooperative society.
Journal: Theoretical Population Biology - Volume 80, Issue 3, November 2011, Pages 226–231