کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
6417727 1339305 2015 23 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Optimal contracting with moral hazard and behavioral preferences
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
قرارداد بهینه با خطر اخلاقی و ترجیحات رفتاری
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه ریاضیات آنالیز ریاضی
چکیده انگلیسی

We consider a continuous-time principal-agent model in which the agent's effort cannot be contracted upon, and both the principal and the agent may have non-standard, cumulative prospect theory type preferences. We find that the optimal contracts are likely to be “more nonlinear” than in the standard case with concave utility preferences. In the special case when the principal is risk-neutral, we show that she will offer a contract which effectively makes the agent less risk averse in the gain domain and less risk seeking in the loss domain, in order to align the agent's risk preference better with the principal's.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications - Volume 428, Issue 2, 15 August 2015, Pages 959-981
نویسندگان
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