Bicycle helmets – A case of risk compensation?

Several studies have shown that bicycle helmets have the potential of reducing injuries from accidents. Yet, no studies have found good evidence of an injury reducing effect in countries that have introduced bicycle helmet legislation. Two of the most promising explanations for why helmet laws do not work as intended are risk compensation and shifts in the cycle population as a response to the law.The present article investigates whether the lack of effect of helmet wearing laws is due to risk compensation mechanisms or population shifts (i.e. discouraging cyclists with the lowest accident risk, and thereby increasing the overall average risk per cyclist). A random sample of 1504 bicycle owners in Norway responded to a questionnaire on among other things helmet use, bicycle equipment use, accident involvement, cycling behaviour and risk perception. Data were analysed by using structural equation model (SEM). The results show that the cyclist population in Norway can be divided into two sub-populations: one speed-happy group that cycle fast and have lots of cycle equipment including helmets, and one traditional kind of cyclist without much equipment, cycling slowly. With all the limitations that have to be placed on a cross sectional study such as this, the results indicate that at least part of the reason why helmet laws do not appear to be beneficial is that they disproportionately discourage the safest cyclists.

► Helmet users are of two types: speed-happy cyclists or traditional slow cyclists.
► Speed happy cyclists have more accidents.
► Poor effect of helmet laws are due to decreased cycling among the low-risk cyclists.
► Helmets are not subject to risk compensation, but part of an equipment package.