کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
957075 | 928506 | 2007 | 25 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Bargaining one-dimensional social choices
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We analyze bargaining over the one-dimension characteristic of a public good among n impatient players when decisions require q favorable votes, q⩾2. Stationary subgame perfect equilibrium strategies are characterized for all games with deterministic protocol. We provide a monotonicity condition (satisfied by all single-peak, strictly quasi-concave and concave utilities) that assures uniqueness for every q whenever player's utilities are symmetric around the peak. Without symmetry, the monotonicity condition assures uniqueness for qualified majorities, q>n/2, provided that agents are sufficiently patient and utilities satisfy an additional regularity condition. Asymptotic uniqueness is assured for qualified majorities by imposing only the monotonicity condition.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 137, Issue 1, November 2007, Pages 627-651
Journal: Journal of Economic Theory - Volume 137, Issue 1, November 2007, Pages 627-651
نویسندگان
Daniel Cardona, Clara PonsatÃ,