کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
972453 932594 2010 12 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Job auctions and hold-ups
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Job auctions and hold-ups
چکیده انگلیسی

We consider a labor market with search frictions in which firms need to invest in capital before they can post a vacancy. This assumption creates a natural scope for hold-up problems, but the innovation of our study is that we allow for competition among the applicants who apply for the same job. In our economy all applicants are paid their actual marginal product. Nonetheless, with random search there exists a hold-up problem, leading to underinvestment in capital. On the contrary, if workers can direct their search towards firms with different capital levels, the equilibrium is efficient. This result contrasts sharply with the predictions of models with ex-post bargaining that never yield an efficient allocation. Moreover, our results extend the efficiency of auction mechanisms to an environment with non-contractible investments.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Labour Economics - Volume 17, Issue 3, June 2010, Pages 608–619
نویسندگان
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