کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
992173 | 935721 | 2012 | 12 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Collective Action Dynamics under External Rewards: Experimental Insights from Andean Farming Communities
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
SummaryThis paper explores the potential effects of external reward systems on conservation behavior by accounting for their interactions with patterns of collective action. In order to simulate such dynamics, we conducted framed field experiments in farming communities from the Bolivian and Peruvian Andes. These game-based simulation exercises were framed around agrobiodiversity conservation decisions the participating farmers were very familiar with. We find that collective rewards could be ineffective and crowd-out social norms. Promisingly though, individual rewards appear to increase conservation levels through a crowding-in effect that stabilizes collective action.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: World Development - Volume 40, Issue 10, October 2012, Pages 2096–2107
Journal: World Development - Volume 40, Issue 10, October 2012, Pages 2096–2107
نویسندگان
Ulf Narloch, Unai Pascual, Adam G. Drucker,