Keywords: D42; D82; D83; G24; L12; Information design; Disclosure; Asymmetric information; Market power; Persuasion;
مقالات ISI (ترجمه نشده)
مقالات زیر هنوز به فارسی ترجمه نشده اند.
در صورتی که به ترجمه آماده هر یک از مقالات زیر نیاز داشته باشید، می توانید سفارش دهید تا مترجمان با تجربه این مجموعه در اسرع وقت آن را برای شما ترجمه نمایند.
در صورتی که به ترجمه آماده هر یک از مقالات زیر نیاز داشته باشید، می توانید سفارش دهید تا مترجمان با تجربه این مجموعه در اسرع وقت آن را برای شما ترجمه نمایند.
Keywords: D01; D82; G34; Mergers and acquisitions; Early announcement; Signal; Negotiation frictions;
Keywords: D82; G21; G23; G30; G32; M41; Debt contracts; Information sharing; Information asymmetries; Hard and soft information; Credit bureaus; Relationship lending; Transactional lending; Information economics; Entrepreneurial finance; Credit reports; Credit scor
Keywords: C72; D82; D83; D85; Communication; Incentives; Information transmission; Networks; Communication equilibrium; Secure communication;
Keywords: Certification intermediaries; Rating agencies; Aggregate uncertainty; Financial crisis; C72; D42; D82;
Keywords: E31; C70; D82; Global games; Menu costs; Sticky prices;
Keywords: D44; D82; C72; Tullock contests; Private values; Information sharing;
Keywords: Bank holding companies; Earnings announcements; Information asymmetry; Quoted bid-ask spreads; D82; G14;
Keywords: D82; Mechanism design; Revelation principle; Ex-post constraints;
Keywords: C72; D82; Analogy-based expectations; Signaling; Streisand effect;
Keywords: D82; L50; Principal-agent relationships; Adverse selection; Countervailing incentives;
Keywords: C72; D82; G14; Asymmetric information; Inside trading; Trading strategies; Trading profit; Nash equilibrium; Price movement;
Keywords: Turf war; Organizations; Bureaucracy; Jurisdiction; Competition; Information withholding; D73; D74; D82;
Keywords: C72; C91; D02; D82; D91; Trust; Laboratory experiment; Monitoring; Repeated game; Social dilemma; Cooperation;
Keywords: D82; D83; Reputational cheap talk; Variance-minimising evaluation; Task difficulty; Information control;
Keywords: AEEGSI; Autorità per l'energia elettrica il gas ed il sistema idrico (Italian energy market regulator, formerly AEEG); DSO; Distribution system operator; EED; Energy Efficiency Directive; EEO; Energy efficiency obligation; EGE; Esperto in Gestione dellâ
Keywords: Committee decision making; Voting experiment; Expert information; Strategic voting; C92; D72; D82;
Keywords: D82; H57; Sequential screening; Static screening; Stochastic mechanisms;
Keywords: C91; D03; D63; D82; Cheating; Lying costs; Incentives; Laboratory experiment;
Keywords: D11; D61; D82; G22; G28; I13; I18; Adverse selection; Information value; Insurance; Moral hazard; Prevention;
Keywords: Principal-agent games; Divide and conquer strategies; Network effects; Two-sided markets; Union formation; Input licensing; C72; D82; L13; K41;
Keywords: G14; C63; D82; Limit order book; Asymmetric information; Genetic algorithm learning; Classifier system; Order submission;
Keywords: D82; I13; G22; Information asymmetry; Health insurance; Adverse selection; Correlation test;
Keywords: Laboratory experiments; Second-price common value auctions; Winner's curse; Level-k; Cursed equilibrium; C92; D44; D82;
Keywords: D80; D82; Unawareness; Bounded rationality; Evolutionarily stable equilibrium;
Keywords: Asymmetric information; Banks; Interest rate spreads; Loans; Relationship lending dimensions; D82; G30; G20; G21; G24; L14; N20;
Keywords: C72; D82; H41; Public good provision; Asymmetric information; Dominant strategy;
Keywords: Asymmetric information; Deception; Ultimatum games; Cheap talk; Threats; C70; C91; D82; 2910; 3020;
Keywords: 024; D82; F13; K21; Trade policy; Competition policy; Consumer protection; Corruption; Hazardous products; Price-fixing; Lemons;
Keywords: D51; D61; D81; D82; Maximin preferences; Maximin efficient allocations; Maximin equilibrium; Implementation;
Keywords: IPO; Signaling; Real options; Asymmetric information; Acquisition; Earnout; G31; G34; D82;
Keywords: D03; D84; D82; I23; Inference; Voluntary disclosure;
Keywords: C70; D44; D60; D82; Privacy; Auctions; Incentive compatibility; Mechanism design; Interdependent values; Ex post incentive compatibility; Informational size;
Keywords: Asymmetric information; Pecking-order theory; Signalling; Timing of earnings; D82; D86; G32;
Keywords: D23; D74; D82; Cheap talk; Multiple senders; Competition;
Keywords: C23; D62; D82; Bunching; Herding; Endogenous timing; Asymmetric equilibrium; Information externality;
Keywords: D82; D83; D03; C72; Rational inattention; Limited attention; Strategic naïveté; Price signaling;
Keywords: D50; D70; D81; D82; Asymmetric information; Incentive compatibility; Insurance equilibrium; Private core; Private information economy; Walrasian expectations equilibrium;
Keywords: L14; L15; D82; D83; Cheap talk; Investments; Credibility;
Keywords: C72; C92; D82; H41; Public goods; Provision point mechanism; Refund bonus; Crowdfunding;
Keywords: D72; D82; H21; Bunching; Ironing; Majority voting; Nonlinear income taxation; Redistributive taxation;
Keywords: C72; C91; D72; D82; Contest; Group size uncertainty; Experiment; Overbidding; Probability weighting; Joy of winning; Constant winning aspirations;
Keywords: Signaling; Public goods; Labor markets; Extracurricular activities; C72; C92; D82;
Keywords: D82; Dynamic mechanism design; Dynamic arrivals; Stochastic process;
Keywords: Auction; Bidding ring; Cartel; Information asymmetry; C72; D44; D82; L41; L40; H57;
Keywords: D82; C73; D44; Dynamic mechanism design; Services; Ticket sales; Restricted mechanisms;
Keywords: Dynamic financial contracting; Moral hazard; Recapitalization; Liquidation; D82; G32; G33;
Keywords: C73; D82; G24; L15; Credit rating agencies; Rating deflation; Rating inflation; Business cycles;
Keywords: D82; H23; L51; Q58; Menus; Dominant strategy; Residual damage; Pecuniary externality;
Keywords: M52; J33; J45; D82; Pay for performance; Public sector management; Information and communication technologies; Asymmetric information; Motivations; Optimal contracts;