Keywords: D82; E51; G21; L14; O33; Small business; Loan contract term; Credit availability; Relationship lending; Bank finance; Survey of Small Business Finances data;
مقالات ISI (ترجمه نشده)
مقالات زیر هنوز به فارسی ترجمه نشده اند.
در صورتی که به ترجمه آماده هر یک از مقالات زیر نیاز داشته باشید، می توانید سفارش دهید تا مترجمان با تجربه این مجموعه در اسرع وقت آن را برای شما ترجمه نمایند.
در صورتی که به ترجمه آماده هر یک از مقالات زیر نیاز داشته باشید، می توانید سفارش دهید تا مترجمان با تجربه این مجموعه در اسرع وقت آن را برای شما ترجمه نمایند.
Keywords: D82; G32; G34; Agency problem; Blockholders; Monitoring; Ownership structure; Asymmetric information;
Keywords: G12; G14; E42; D82; D83; Liquidity; Money; Information; Experiments;
Keywords: D71; D82; J45; Committee decision-making; Adverse selection; Screening; Efficiency wages; Transparency; Career concerns;
Keywords: C71; C78; D82; Bargaining; Third-party intervention; Third-party selection; Mechanism design;
Keywords: D82; G2; Q5; R52; Shale gas; Regulatory compliance; General deterrence; Environmental bonds; Impact fee;
Keywords: Marriage; Matchmaking; Parental matchmaking; China; Agency cost; Old age support; Parental goods; Preference manipulation; Endogenous institutions; J12; D82; D83;
Keywords: G32; G34; D82; Financial contracting; Incomplete contracts; Creditor rights; Asymmetric information; Agency problems;
Keywords: D47; D71; D82; Implementation; Partial equilibrium; Complementarity; Income effect;
Keywords: Relationships; Banking; Covenants; Information asymmetries; Monitoring incentives; D82; G21; G30; G32; L14;
Keywords: Robust mechanism design; Social preferences; Bilateral trade; Income taxation; C92; D02; D03; D82; H2;
Keywords: D82; C72; C73; Taking turns; Mechanism design; Ex post incentive compatibility; Repeated games;
Keywords: Multi-unit auctions; Vickrey Clarke Groves (VCG) mechanism; Exposure problem; Synergies; Complementarity; Spectrum license auction; D44; D82;
Keywords: D82; G10; G14; O31; Stock options; Option listings; Asymmetric information; Adoption rates; Option volume; Open interest;
Keywords: Information disclosure; Equity auctions; Post-auction investment; Moral hazard; D44; D82; G10;
Keywords: D82; G12; G14; News sentiment; Financial news; Market responses; Causality; Portfolio management;
Keywords: D02; D82; D83; Test design; Bayesian learning; Concavification; False positive; Asymmetric information; Voluntary participation;
Keywords: D82; H23; K13; K41; K42; Litigation; Law enforcement; Courts; Fee shifting; Decoupling; Filing fees; Burden of proof;
Keywords: Regulation; Independent regulatory agency; Regulatory risk; Electoral uncertainty; D82;
Keywords: Risk; Power of incentives; Product market competition; Innovation; D82; L13; O30;
Keywords: R&D; Invention; Innovation; Contract; Principal; Agent; Incentives; D82; D83; O3;
Keywords: C92; D82; D84; G10; Asymmetric information; Experimental asset markets; Information acquisition; Prediction markets;
Keywords: D72; D82; Voting; Elections; Mandates; Ideology; Information aggregation; Polarization; Parties; Jury theorem; Public opinion; Swing voter's curse; Turnout; Abstention;
Keywords: C92; D82; G12; Insider legislation; Asset market; Price efficiency; Trading behavior; Experimental finance;
Keywords: D44; D82; Auctions; Information release; Order statistics; Stochastic orders; Dispersive order; Excess wealth order;
Keywords: D82; G14; G18; Unexplained trading; Query announcement; Event study;
Keywords: Risk regulation; Incentives; Moral hazard; Adverse selection; Insolvency; L51; D82; Q58;
Keywords: Entry; Vertical Contracting; Asymmetric Information; D43; D82; L13; L51,;
Keywords: C78; C91; D82; D83; Adverse selection; Cheap-talk; Decentralized markets; Experiment; Frictions; Information transmission; Market for lemons;
Keywords: C72; C92; D82; D83; H41; Communication; Cheap talk; Message space; Public good provision;
Keywords: C78; D47; D82; R4; Mechanism design; Landing slots; Matching; Incentives;
Keywords: Law of proportionate effects; Financial constraints; Growth cash flow sensitivity; Leverage effect; GMM; C23; D82; G32; L25;
Keywords: C73; D82; Belief-free equilibrium; Evolutionary stability; Private monitoring; Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma; Communication;
Keywords: D44; D82; G14; Divisible double auctions; Bilateral trading; Bargaining; Ex post equilibrium;
Keywords: Second-price auctions; Resale; Participation cost; Endogenous entry; Endogenous valuations; C72; D44; D82;
Keywords: C78; D47; D82; Stable matching; Incomplete information; Incomplete-information core;
Keywords: C61; C71; C73; D82; Uncertain conditions; Cooperation; Dynamical shapley value; Coordination mechanism; Optimal strategies;
Keywords: D82; G21; G28; Information sharing; Credit market; Default rate;
Keywords: C90; C91; D80; D82; Preferences elicitation; Data privacy; Informational privacy; Experiment;
Keywords: D44; D82; Mechanism design; Approximation; Interdependent values; Revenue maximization;
Keywords: D82; D83; E40; E50; Money; Counterfeiting; Screening; Verification; Search;
Keywords: Bundling; Correlated valuations; Monopoly pricing; Price discrimination; Random mechanism; D11; D42; D82; L12;
Keywords: Revenue maximization; Excludable public goods; Two-sided platforms; Optimal pricing; Digital goods; C72; D82; L13;
Keywords: C73; D82; D85; Z13; Repeated games; Social networks; Cohesiveness;
Keywords: D82; D71; D02; Budget-balanced mechanisms; Green-Laffont mechanism; Pareto optimal mechanism;
Keywords: D82; J3; J81; J88; M52; Principal-agent model; Working conditions; Regulation; Standards;
Keywords: C72; D82; D83; Cheap talk; Strategic communication; Robustness; Incomplete information;
Keywords: D40; D44; D80; D82; Mechanism design; Surplus extraction; Universal type space; Genericity; Correlated information; Strategic continuity;
Keywords: C72; C79; D82; D83; Incomplete information; Informational robustness; Bayes correlated equilibrium; Interim correlated rationalizability; Belief-free rationalizability;
Keywords: D74; D82; C70; Intelligence system; Deterrence; Weapons of mass destruction; Incomplete information; Pooling and separating equilibria;