Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; G21; G32; G34; M41; Debt contract renegotiation; Contracting costs; Monitoring; Creditor control rights; Incomplete contracts;
مقالات ISI قراردادهای ناقص (ترجمه نشده)
مقالات زیر هنوز به فارسی ترجمه نشده اند.
در صورتی که به ترجمه آماده هر یک از مقالات زیر نیاز داشته باشید، می توانید سفارش دهید تا مترجمان با تجربه این مجموعه در اسرع وقت آن را برای شما ترجمه نمایند.
در صورتی که به ترجمه آماده هر یک از مقالات زیر نیاز داشته باشید، می توانید سفارش دهید تا مترجمان با تجربه این مجموعه در اسرع وقت آن را برای شما ترجمه نمایند.
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; C78; D03; D86; Behavioral contract theory; Expectation-based loss aversion; Hold-up problem; Incomplete contracts; Renegotiation;
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; D23; D86; C78; H41; L31; Transaction costs; Public goods; Property rights; Bargaining; Incomplete contracts;
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; D8; K2; K4; L5; Enforcement; Deterrence; Legal uncertainty; Regulation; Asymmetric information; Incomplete contracts;
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; Incomplete contracts; Long-term relationships; Renewable dismissal barriers; Workers' stability; Investment and experiments; J41; J3; C91; D01;
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; G32; G34; D82; Financial contracting; Incomplete contracts; Creditor rights; Asymmetric information; Agency problems;
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; D23; D86; C78; L24; O32; Property rights; Incomplete contracts; Investment incentives; Partnership dissolution; Shared ownership;
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; D23; D86; O32; C92; Property rights; Incomplete contracts; Investment incentives; Laboratory experiments;
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; D23; D86; L24; Incomplete contracts; Property rights; Investment spillovers; Joint-control;
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; H57; I18; L33; Competition; Incomplete contracts; Mortality; Outsourcing; Public procurement;
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; Foreign direct investment; Ownership; Ownership change; Property rights theory; Incomplete contracts; Corruption; Financial markets;
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; D23; D86; L14; L24; Incomplete contracts; Property rights approach; Vertical integration; Joint ownership; Transaction costs;
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; Information transparency; Efficiency; Fairness; Incomplete contracts
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; Ownership; Incomplete contracts; Investment incentives; Bargaining frictions; Public goods; D23; D86; C78; H41; L31;
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; Informal sector; Market regulations; Taxi experiment; Incomplete contracts; Transaction costs; Institutions; Natural field experiment; Environmental economics;
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; D23; D86; C78; H41; L31; Ownership; Incomplete contracts; Investment incentives; Public goods; Bargaining;
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; D80; D82; Ambiguity; Bounded rationality; Expected uncertain utility; Incomplete contracts; Liquidated damages;
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; K12; L22; J41; C70; Breach remedies; Incomplete contracts; Hybrid investments; Cooperative investments; Selfish investments;
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; D23; D82; D86; Incomplete contracts; Relationship-specific investments; Hold-up problem; Signaling games;
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; D23; D86; C78; L22; L24; Ownership; Incomplete contracts; Relationship-specificity; Theory of the firm; Investment incentives;
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; D23; D86; C78; L23; Ownership; Incomplete contracts; Bargaining; Investment incentives;
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; Relational contracts; Incomplete contracts; Framework contracts;
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; F23; F14; L22; L23; Productivity; Incomplete contracts; Intra-group trade; Outsourcing;
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; F14; F23; L14; L33; Intra-firm trade; Incomplete contracts; Vertical integration; Outsourcing; Fixed-costs;
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; C91; D23; D86; Incomplete contracts; Relationship-specific investments; Allocation of power; Social preferences; Experiments;
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; D01; D83; D86; Unawareness; Moral hazard; Incomplete contracts;
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; D23; D82; D86; L23; L24; Property rights; Relationship specificity; Investment incentives; Private information; Incomplete contracts;
Charity, incentives, and performance
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; Charity; Incomplete contracts; Experiments; D01; L33; M52;
Corruption in PPPs, incentives and contract incompleteness
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; D23; D82; K42; L33; Corruption; Incomplete contracts; Moral hazard; Principal-agent-supervisor model; Public-private partnerships; Risk allocation;
On platforms, incomplete contracts, and open source software
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; C70; D23; L13; L22; L86; Platforms; Open source; Standardization; Incomplete contracts; Property rights; Information Technology;
Public–private partnerships versus traditional procurement: An experimental investigation
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; D86; L33; H11Public–private partnerships; Procurement; Incomplete contracts; Experiment
Public goods and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; D82; D86; H41; Asymmetric information; Incomplete contracts; Investment incentives; Public goods;
Reputation, competition, and entry in procurement
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; H57; L14; L15; L24; Accountability; Discretion; Entry; Incomplete contracts; Limited enforcement; Past performance; Procurement; Quality; Relational contracts; Reputation; Restricted auctions;
Differential awareness, ambiguity, and incomplete contracts: A model of contractual disputes
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; D80; D82Ambiguity; Bounded rationality; Expected uncertain utility; Incomplete contracts
Trade liberalization and organizational change
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; D23; F13; F23; Theory of the firm; Incomplete contracts; Globalization;
Effective incomplete contracts and milestones in market-distant R&D collaboration
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; R&D collaboration; Moral hazard; Incomplete contracts; Incentives; Patent ownership; Milestone-dependent payments
Fixing the contract after the contract is fixed: A study of incomplete contracts in IT and construction projects
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; Interorganizational projects; Incomplete contracts; Financial incentives; Influence tactics
Investment incentives in bilateral trading
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; C72; C78; D44; D82; Bilateral trading; k-Double auctions; Incomplete contracts; Investment incentives; Optimal mechanism; Opt-out clause;
Flexibility in industrial product-service systems and use-oriented business models
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; Use-oriented business models; Industrial product-service systems; Incomplete contracts; Flexibility; Modularity in design
Explaining unrestricted giving by charitable foundations: A transaction cost approach
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; L2; L3; D8; Nonprofit; Grant; Incomplete contracts; Transaction costs;
Contractual incompleteness as a signal of trust
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; D86; D82; Trust; Incomplete contracts; Signaling;
Public-private partnerships: Task interdependence and contractibility
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; D23; H11; L33; Complementarity; Substitutability; Incomplete contracts; Public-private partnership;
Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; D23; D63; J31; J33; M12; Z13; Contract theory; Linear contracts; Incentives; Sufficient statistics result; Inequity aversion; Incomplete contracts;
Public-private partnerships and the privatization of financing: An incomplete contracts approach
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; H11; G32; D23; L20; Public-private partnerships; Incomplete contracts; Soft budget constraints;
When prices hardly matter: Incomplete insurance contracts and markets for repair goods
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; D43; D62; G22; I11; Insurance; Repair markets; Incomplete contracts;
Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; Hold-up problem; Incomplete contracts; Investment incentives; D86; D82;
Indescribability and asymmetric information at the contracting stage
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; Asymmetric information; Incentive compatibility; Incomplete contracts; Indescribability; Individual rationality; C72; D78; D82;
Delivering trusting partnerships for route bus services: A Melbourne case study
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; Public transit; Competition; Tendering; Negotiation; Efficiency; Trusting partnerships; Incomplete contracts
Transacting under a performance-based contract: The role of negotiation and competitive tendering
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; Public transit; Competition; Tendering; Negotiation; Efficiency; Trusting partnerships; Incomplete contracts; Contractible quality; Non-contractible quality
Social preferences and public economics: Mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives
Keywords: قراردادهای ناقص; D52 (incomplete markets); D64 (altruism); H21 (efficiency, optimal taxation) H41; (public goods)Social preferences; Implementation theory; Incentive contracts; Incomplete contracts; Framing; Motivational crowding out; Ethical norms; Constitutions