Toward an understanding of the endogenous nature of group identification in games

It is commonly assumed that identification with a social group is constant throughout the play of a one-shot game in the absence of feedback. Our experiment provides evidence that challenges this assumption. Subjects play one of two versions of the prisoner's dilemma game. These versions are distinguished by the relative attractiveness of the uncooperative action. The version with a relatively attractive uncooperative action is referred to as the Easy Game and the other as the Difficult Game. Subjects who play the Difficult Game, exhibit a change in group identification which is related to their selected action. No such relationship exists within the Easy Game. Additionally, the change primarily occurs after the action is selected rather than upon inspection of the game.

► We provide evidence that social identification is not constant during play of a game.
► We show that the action selected and the form of the game can affect identification.
► We employ two versions of the prisoner's dilemma game.
► Choice in one game is more difficult than choice in the other game.
► The action selected in the Difficult Game is related to a change in identification.