A game theory approach to fishers' strategic behavior vis-Ã -vis hotel-based water sports operators - The case of the Balaclava Marine Park project in Mauritius

Using a game theory framework, this paper models the behavior of two stakeholder groups who are concerned with the implementation and enforcement of a marine park at Balaclava, situated in the North-West of the island of Mauritius, located in the Indian Ocean. These two stakeholders are artisanal fishers and hotel-based pleasure craft/water-sports operators who often have to compete spatially within the lagoon to carry out their activity. Nash equilibrium results show that fishers and pleasure craft operators may reach a sub-optimal outcome, leading to unsustainability of marine resources. Empirical verification of strategic motives, attitudes and perceptions, using a questionnaire-based survey, actually revealed that there is little convincing evidence that both parties would be able to collaborate and co-manage the park successfully despite the fact that they agree that a marine park is vital for protecting marine resources. While 81.3 per cent of the fishers and 90.1 per cent of the hotel water-based sports operators were in favor of a marine park, only 28 per cent of the hotel sports operators would be willing to work in collaboration with fishers and 46 per cent of the fishers would be willing to work with their counterparts. One of the major policy recommendations that emanates from this study is that the authorities should come up with an effective action plan to foster more dialogues among all concerned stakeholders and emphasize the virtues of co-management for the sustainability of the park.