کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
932596 | 1474715 | 2015 | 13 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |

• Alleged purely evidential meaning is no longer present in Mexican Spanish.
• Epistemic meanings have taken over reportative meanings.
• Further pragmatic extensions have developed as an epistemic marker in Mexican Spanish.
In contrast with previous approaches that analyze dizque ‘supposedly, allegedly’ as a purely evidential marker encoding reported speech and implying epistemic modality (Travis, 2006 and Olbertz, 2007), this paper proposes, from a Cognitive Grammar perspective, that the core meaning of dizque corresponds to a schematic representation where the veracity of events is called into question. New extensions develop to disqualify events as either false or inadequate since they lack some nuclear property of their category. It is proposed that the core meaning of dizque has changed from reportative to a pragmatic marker encoding epistemic and evaluative readings. As a nominal modifier dizque undertakes evaluative meanings, as a clause modifier it undertakes epistemic readings. Further extensions from epistemic readings imply intentions of bragging, pretending and deceiving as seen from the speaker's perspective. Evaluative and epistemic meanings have taken over the old reportative function of dizque to such extent that the complementizer que must be introduced to create a new evidential-epistemic marker que dizque, where que attests that what is being questioned was expressed by some unidentified source and dizque questions the veracity of the clause. Finally, the emergence of an even newer epistemic marker quesque emerging in Mexican informal speech is accounted for in terms of weakened evidentiality and increased epistemicity.
Journal: Journal of Pragmatics - Volume 85, August 2015, Pages 168–180