Simple and complex deceits and ironies

In the classical philosophy of language a distinction is made between direct and indirect speech acts. In the present paper we propose that a new distinction, between simple and complex communicative acts, can include any kind of pragmatic phenomena, including deceit and irony. In particular, we assume that a complex act, with respect to a simple act of the same sort, e.g., irony, requires a complex inferential chain in order to grasp the communicative intention of the speaker. Therefore, we predict that complex acts are more difficult to comprehend than simple acts. Furthermore, we assume that simple acts of different sorts, e.g., deceit and irony, involve mental representations of different degrees of complexity. Therefore, we predict that simple standard acts are easier than simple deceits, which are in turn easier than simple ironies. Overall our predictions are confirmed by the results of an experiment carried out on 96 children aged 6;6–10 years. Some unexpected results are also interpretable within the proposed framework.