Keywords: Auction theory; Market design; Spectrum auction; D44; D47;
مقالات ISI (ترجمه نشده)
مقالات زیر هنوز به فارسی ترجمه نشده اند.
در صورتی که به ترجمه آماده هر یک از مقالات زیر نیاز داشته باشید، می توانید سفارش دهید تا مترجمان با تجربه این مجموعه در اسرع وقت آن را برای شما ترجمه نمایند.
در صورتی که به ترجمه آماده هر یک از مقالات زیر نیاز داشته باشید، می توانید سفارش دهید تا مترجمان با تجربه این مجموعه در اسرع وقت آن را برای شما ترجمه نمایند.
Keywords: C78; C62; D47; L14; Many-to-many matching; Stability; Substitutes; Contract design;
Keywords: D47; D71; D82; Implementation; Partial equilibrium; Complementarity; Income effect;
Keywords: C78; D47; D82; R4; Mechanism design; Landing slots; Matching; Incentives;
Keywords: C78; D44; D47; Extension monotonicity; Resource monotonicity; Population monotonicity; Respecting improvements; The cumulative offer process; Matching with contracts;
Keywords: C78; D47; D82; Stable matching; Incomplete information; Incomplete-information core;
Keywords: Cost allocation; Networks; Gains; Electricity; Smart grids; C63; D47; D63; L94;
Keywords: C70; D47; D61; D63; Matching; Distributional constraints; Efficiency; Stability; Strategy-proofness;
Keywords: C78; D47; D02; Two-sided matching; Matching with ties; Matching with indifferences; Efficient and stable matching;
Keywords: Procurement; Outsourcing; Subcontracting; Auction; Mechanism design; Asymmetric information; D44; D47; D82; L23; C72;
Keywords: C63; C88; D44; D47; L86; M37; Computational mechanism analysis; Position auctions; Sponsored search; Compact game representations;
Keywords: D43; D47; F30; F31; F33; G12; G15; Foreign exchange markets; Fixing; Tokyo fixing; WM/Reuters; Efficient market; Spikes; Prehedge;
Keywords: Dark pool; Pecking order; Fragmentation; G12; G14; G18; D47;
Keywords: D44; D47; D82; Optimal auction; All-pay auction; Budget constraints; Liquidity;
Keywords: C72; C78; D47; Matching; Nursery school choice; Serial dictatorship;
Keywords: C78; D47; Matching; Contracts; Stability; Couples; Weak substitutability; Bilateral substitutability;
Keywords: C71; C78; D44; D47; Median stable matchings; Many-to-one matching with wages; Many-to-many matching; Matching with contracts; Strong substitutability; The law of aggregate demand;
Keywords: Market microstructure; Heuristic-driven trader; Probability of informed trading; Probability of heuristic-driven trading; Contrarian trader; Size effect; Volume effect; D47; D53; D82; G02;
Keywords: C78; D47; D61; Random assignment; Random serial dictatorship; Strategy-proofness; Ordinal efficiency; Non-wastefulness;
Keywords: D44; D47; D82; Position auctions; Dynamic resizing; Reserve prices; Mechanism design; Online advertising; Vickrey-Clarke-Groves;
Keywords: C22; C54; D47; Q40; Q48; Restructured electricity prices; Fractal noise; Long memory; Persistence; Energy Policies; Market Efficiency; Bidding Structure;
Keywords: D44; D47; D61; D82; Multi-unit auctions; Vickrey auctions; Uniform-price auctions; Wealth effects;
Keywords: L86; L81; D47; D82; L15; Reputation; Rating; Consumer feedback; Pricing; e-Commerce;
Keywords: C78; C92; D47; Two-sided matching; Truncation strategies; Experiments;
Keywords: D47; D83; I18; Shortage; Blood donation; Family replacement; Non-price method; Market design;
Keywords: C78; D47; D71; Market design; Strategy-proofness; Second-best incentive compatibility; Top trading cycles rules; Deferred acceptance rules;
Keywords: C78; C90; D47; D82; School choice mechanisms; Market design; Experimental economics; Matching theory;
Keywords: C78; C92; C71; D47; Matching; Stability; Competitive equilibrium; Core; Price controls;
Keywords: D44; D47; D82; Partnership; Auction; Dynamic; Fair division;
Keywords: C78; D47; D82; One sided matching; Complementarities; Strategy-proof; Efficient; Envy-free; Mechanism;
Keywords: D82; D44; D47; Local incentive compatibility; Payment-only incentive compatibility; Single peaked type space; Ordinal type space;
Keywords: C78; D47; D78; H75; I21; School choice; School quality; Matching; Stability; Efficiency;
Keywords: C78; D47; D71; D78; School choice; Affirmative action; Minimal responsiveness;
Keywords: D47; L26; L11; Market design; Pricing; Fair Pricing;
Keywords: Price Discrimination; Monopoly; Mechanism Design; D82; D4; D42; D47;
Keywords: C73; D47; D82; The dynamic pivot mechanism; Dynamic mechanism design; Budget balance; VCG mechanism; Bilateral trading;
Keywords: D04; D22; D41; D43; D47; D60; SO; system operator; MCP; market-clearing price; IGMC; Iran Grid Management Company; MO; market operator; REWC; regional electricity and water companies; MOE; Iran's Ministry of Energy.; Iran's pay-as-bid electricity market;
Keywords: Electricity sector reform; Unbundling; Regulation; Transmission investment; Independent system operator; D47; L23; L43; L51; L94;
Keywords: Q2; D44; D47; Experience weighted attraction learning; Fishery quota market; Information feedback; Intelligent agent bidders (robots); Laboratory experiments; Multiple unit forward combinatorial auctions;
Keywords: Market design; Generation adequacy; Capacity mechanisms; Internal European Market; D47; L11; L52; L94;
Keywords: C72; C78; D47; D82; Approximate mechanisms without money; Kidney exchange;
Keywords: Online markets; Buy-it-now; Mechanism choice; eBay; Auctions; C57; D44; L11; L81; L86; D47;
Keywords: Conditional value at risk; Energy efficiency; Incentive mechanisms; Uncertainty; D47; D81; D82; L94;
Keywords: D47; D83; G11; Skills; Market fragmentation; Volatility; Market resilience;
Keywords: D43; D44; D47; D82; G14; L13Double auction; Price impact; Price informativeness; Rational expectations; Market design
Keywords: D70; D63; D47; D61; Strategy-proofness; Consistency; Resource-monotonicity;
Keywords: C78; D47; D82; House allocation problem; Efficient assignment; Interdependent values; Ex-post implementation; Approximate ex-post implementation; Bayesian implementation;
Keywords: C62; C71; C78; D47; D85; L14; Matching; Networks; Joint ventures; Stability; Competitive equilibrium; Core;
Keywords: C72; C78; D47; D82; Kidney exchange; Random graphs; Mechanism design; Maximum matching; Integer programming; Incentive compatible design;
Keywords: D44; D47; D51; Indivisibilities; Competitive equilibrium; Gross substitutes and complements; Auctions;